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BLACK AND WHITE AFTER BROWN:
CONSTRUCTIONS OF RACE IN MODERN SUPREME
COURT DECISIONS
Rogers M. Smith
This essay examines one dimension of a quite broad-ranging
topic: how modern American law is explicitly and implicitly construct-
ing the racial identities of contemporary American citizens. I focus
on two contrasting conceptions of "white" and "black" racial identity
visible in decisions of the United States Supreme Court during the
post-Jim Crow era.' I term these the "damaged race" and the "racial
irrelevance" views (though the latter is more customarily referred to
as "color-blind" constitutionalism).2 I argue that both these concep-
tions are flawed, because both can easily be understood to imply that
whites today are as a group superior to blacks in America, and belief
in such superiority can in turn support policies and practices that
continue to privilege white interests.
I suggest that a third conception, that of "distinct racial damages,"
does more to make sense of how the law has helped create the racial
identities that Americans still experience themselves as possessing. It
holds that both "blacks" and "whites" today should be seen as social
groups that are still harmed by the consequences of past official con-
structions of race, though in very different ways. This conception of
contemporary racial identities is, I believe, simply accurate; it may
also serve as a better guide to legal and political action on race-
related issues. Though I think that this analysis can be extended to
encompass the great variety of racial identities in past and present
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America, I confine the argument here to Supreme Court depictions
of "blacks" and "whites." Those constructions have, I believe, done
the most to shape the law's approach to racial topics.
I. PRELIMINARIES: RACE AS A POLITICAL AND LEGAL CONSTRUCTION
My arguments are premised on what is now a widely accepted be-
lief: that, because racial categories do not make biological sense and
yet have been pervasive in United States history, they must be seen as
social and political constructions, and law must be seen as an impor-
tant contributor to those constructions! Accordingly, I view racial
classifications fundamentally as invented labels embraced by political
actors to help assign different statuses to different populations, gen-
erally for purposes of economic exploitation and consolidation of
group power. The inventors of the labels have often been scientists,
theologians, historians, journalists, and contributors to popular cul-
ture, but the official codification of these labels into law does much
to increase their power to shape social experiences and opportunities
3 Some scholars, to be sure, still vigorously defend biological conceptions of race. See, e.g.,
J. PHILIPPE RUSHTON, RACE, EVOLUTION AND BEHAVIOR: A LIFE HISTORY PERSPECTIVE (1995) (ar-
guing that substantial differences, including brain size and thereby intelligence, exist among
races because of evolution). For influential discussions of the social and political construction
of racial identities, see generally NOEL IGNATIEV, How THE IRISH BECAME WHITE (1995) (exam-
ining the connections between concepts of race and acts of oppression, focusing on the Catho-
lic Irish who were oppressed in Ireland and became part of an oppressing race in America);
MATTHEW FRYEJACOBSON, WHITENESS OF A DIFFERENT COLOR: EUROPEAN IMMIGRANTS AND THE
ALCHEMY OF RACE (1998) (describing how conceptions of race were public fictions that rose
and fell in American social consciousness); MICHAEL OMI & HOWARD WINANT, RACIAL
FORMATION IN THE UNITED STATES: FROM THE 1960S TO THE 1990S (2d ed. 1994) (discussing the
theory of racial formation processes, including the question of racism and race-class-gender in-
terrelationships); DAVID R. ROEDIGER, TOWARDS THE ABOLITION OF WHITENESS: ESSAYS ON RACE,
POLITICS, AND WORKING CLASS HISTORY ix (1994) (suggesting that "race and class are so imbri-
cated in the consciousness of working class Americans that we do not 'get' class if we do not
'get' race"); DAVID R. ROEDIGER, THE WAGES OF WHITENESS: RACE AND THE MAKING OF THE
AMERICAN WORKING CLASS (1991) (exploring the development of the identity of "whiteness"
among the white working class). For discussion of the legal construction of racial identities, see
generally IAN F. HANEY LOPEZ, WHITE BY LAW: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF RACE (1996) (ex-
amining how the concepts of "whiteness," race, and law have been influenced by social and le-
gal constructs); EFR9N RIVERA RAMOS, THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF IDENTITY: THE JUDICIAL
AND SOCIAL LEGACY OF AMERICAN COLONIALISM IN PUERTO RICO (2001) (examining the history
of the relationship between the United States and Puerto Rico from a socio-legal perspective,
and illuminating the role of law in the construction of relationships of subordination). See also
generally Angela P. Harris, Equality Trouble: Sameness and Difference in Twentieth-Century Race Law,
88 CAL. L. REV. 1923 (2000) (arguing that race law consists of antidiscrimination law as well as
law pertaining to the formation, recognition and maintenance of racial groups and the legal
regulation of relationships among these groups); and many other works by scholars associated
with the "Critical Race Theory" movement in American law schools.
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and thereby to constitute identities. For science, theology, history,
and culture have always offered up many often contradictory concep-
tions of race. Politics and law put the coercive force of government
behind some of those conceptions, institutionalizing them in many
arenas of life. Consequently, I see politics and law as playing the most
decisive roles in constructing the racial identities that become part of
the everyday lived experience of great numbers of people. I there-
fore join emphatically with Angela Harris and other legal scholars as-
sociated with Critical Race Theory, who argue that we must attend
today to the ways that "race law" has contributed "to the formation,
recognition, and maintenance of racial groups," not just to whether
"relationships among these groups" have been sufficiently "equal,"
important though that is.
4
But because racial labels have been such a large part of lived ex-
perience in America, it would be misleading to think that they exist
simply as governmentally imposed devices that work to privilege some
and oppress others. The long-exploited and oppressed populations
on whom such labels have been imposed have often embraced them
as defining their "real" identities, sometimes even more explicitly and
fervently than those whom the labels have directly benefited. This is
perfectly understandable, politically and psychologically. The identi-
ties that are used to define and justify subjugation become for that
very reason categories of shared experiences and interests, of "linked
fate," to use Michael Dawson's term, that can unite the oppressed.5
They are in fact almost inescapable bases for building senses of soli-
darity, for achieving mutual comfort, expressing cultural creativity,
and constructing social lives, as well as for organizing joint political
resistance to unjust treatment. In all these regards, there are strong
tendencies to take the labels that are used as pejoratives by oppres-
sors and redefine them as indicators of virtue and worth.
The philosopher-psychologist Friedrich Nietzsche saw such re-
definitions as characteristic of all subjugated peoples, even if he de-
rided what he called the "slave" moralities that resulted.6 James C.
Scott has argued persuasively in recent years that these sorts of "inver-
sions" of the categories, symbols, and concepts used to defend domi-
nation constitute one of the "weapons of the weak," employed when
4 Harris, supra note 3, at 1928.
5 For the "linked fate" argument, see MICHAEL C. DAWSON, BEHIND THE MULE: RACE AND
CLASS IN AFRICAN-AMERICAN POLITICS 76-80 (1994).
6 See FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, ON THE GENEALOGY OF MORALS AND ECCE HOMO 33-43 (Walter
Kaufmann ed., 2d ed. 1969).
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more direct forms of resistance are not practical These realities
mean that even though the labels "white" and "black" (and "red" and
later "yellow") may have been officially propagated by Americans of
European descent to justify their seizure of lands from the native
tribes, their imposition of chattel slavery on Africans, and later immi-
gration restrictions, it is wrong to see the various non-white identities
as simply invidious inventions. Most of these labels have long since
become categories that many so classified now esteem and regard as
deeply constitutive, not only of who they are, but also of who they
wish to be.
That reality raises normative complexities to which we will return.
It is in contrast a fairly straightforward task to show that racial identi-
ties in America have been extensively structured by laws and by the
politics that has generated those laws, and that racial identities have
changed historically as American law and politics have changed. The
task is straightforward because this dimension of United States history
has been extensively explored by a wide variety of scholars in recent
decades. It has also formed one central theme of my own work on
American citizenship laws.8 In brief, from 1790 until the mid-
twentieth century, federal naturalization laws made being "white,"
and then being "white" or of "African" descent, legal requirements
for foreign-born persons to become United States citizens. Late nine-
teenth and early twentieth century courts struggled mightily to decide
who was and was not "white," finally settling on the conceptions that a
long history of legal racial construction had made to seem "common-
sensical" to most Americans.9 The Court's rulings, in turn, partly de-
termined who could "pass" as a genuinely free and equal white per-
son, as well as who could be a citizen. Similarly, from the Chinese
Exclusion Act through the National Origins Quota laws" that lasted
from the 1920s to 1965, immigration statutes incorporated shifting
7 SeeJAMES C. SCOTT, DOMINATION AND THE ARTS OF RESISTANCE: HIDDEN TRANSCRIPTS 166-
72 (1990).
8 See especially ROGERS M. SMITH, CIVIC IDEALS: CONFLICTING VISIONS OF CITIZENSHIP IN U.S.
HISTORY (1997) (arguing that denial of legal access to full citizenship because of race, ethnicity,
or gender has defined U.S. civic identity and driven political development).
9 The most accessible discussion is L6PEZ, supra note 3, but see also the seminal essay by
Stanford M. Lyman, The Race Question and Liberalism: Casuistries in American Constitutional Law, 5
INT'LJ. POL. CULTURE & SOC'Y 183 (1991).
to Chinese Exclusion Act, ch. 126, 22 Stat. 58 (1882) (repealed 1943) (suspending immigra-
tion of Chinese Laborers for 10 years and barring Chinese from naturalization).
I Immigration Act of 1924, ch. 190, 43 Stat. 153 (repealed 1952) (limiting immigration
from a country to two percent of that nationality's proportion of foreign-born individuals in the
United States, according to the 1890 census).
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racial definitions that helped decide who had access to American
shores and, thereafter, citizenship. 
1 2
Domestically, a variety of antebellum state laws and twentieth cen-
tury Jim Crow laws offered differing definitions of "blackness," so that
for many decades a person of mixed ancestry could change racial
identities simply by crossing state lines.' Census categories have long
included (and indeed still include) racial categories, often contested
and frequently altered, that have always reflected different politically
potent conceptions of race. Those categorizations, in turn, affect eli-
gibility for governmental benefits, and they also shape processes of
political coalition building. 4 And for decades, twentieth century fed-
eral policies authorized various forms of racial red-lining in real es-
tate and loan industries as well, greatly contributing to the patterns of
hyper-segregation that have done so much to foster distinct and
highly unequal racial experiences in America. The list goes on and
on.
Although these laws were not the original sources of conceptions
of race nor were they the only routes through which notions of
"whiteness" and "blackness" were institutionalized, no one can credi-
bly deny that they mattered greatly. In the absence of such legal
measures, it is far from clear that racial identities would have
achieved such salience in American lives and come to seem so "natu-
ral" and "primordial" as they did; they almost certainly would not
have had the same specific content. It is also likely that many more
Americans would have been of Asian descent through much of our
history; many more African-Americans and Mexican Americans would
have achieved socioeconomic statuses comparable to "whites" much
sooner; and many of the most violent and destructive chapters in
American history might never have been written.
12 See DANIEL J. TICHENOR, DIVIDING LINES: THE POLITICS OF IMMIGRATION CONTROL IN
AMERICA (2002) (providing a valuable new overview and analysis of how immigration policies
have shaped American identity).
13 See, e.g., JOEL WILLIAMSON, NEW PEOPLE: MISCEGENATION AND MULATrOES IN THE UNITED
STATES (1980) (discussing various states' attempts to define exactly what constituted a "negro").
14 For a useful recent discussion that includes an international comparative perspective, see
generally MELISSA NOBLES, SHADES OF CITIZENSHIP: RACE AND THE CENSUS IN MODERN POLITICS
(2000), which uses the censuses from both the United States and Brazil to explore racial cate-
gorization.
15 The most compelling single study remains DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON,
AMERICAN APARTHEID: SEGREGATION AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS 1 (1993) ("Most
Americans vaguely realize that urban America is still a residentially segregated society, but few
appreciate the depth of the degree to which it is maintained by ongoing institutional arrange-
ments and contemporary individual actions.").
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Within the American legal system, the voice of the United States
Supreme Court speaks with particular prominence on a wide range of
matters, arguably including matters of race. It is plausible to think,
for example, that if the Supreme Court had not legitimated Jim Crow
segregation in Plessy v. Ferguson,16 the American version of apartheid
might never have become so deeply entrenched in our national life
as it did over the next half century. One can reasonably question
how extensively the conceptions of race advanced in little-read Su-
preme Court decisions actually shape popular thinking or public
policies over time. I cannot provide empirical evidence for that im-
pact here. But I can provide some documentation for how Supreme
Court racial formulations come to be echoed throughout American
law, and it seems reasonable to suppose that those widespread echoes
have some effect on broader political and popular discourses. It is
plausible, in other words, to agree with Fran Buntman, that legal no-
tions of race are often "incorporated into the mainstream and hege-
monic culture once the Supreme Court asserts them as part of what
the Constitution requires, or, even more crudely, as part of the mean-
ing of being American."'" And if this incorporation occurs to any de-
gree at all, it is important for scholars of American politics as well. as
law to attend to the conceptions of race that the Court is propagat-
ing.
II. BROWN V. BOARD OFEDUCATIONAND THE "DAMAGED RACE"
CONCEPTION
Although it is not difficult to see that American statutes had a sig-
nificant role in constructing American racial identities prior to the
1950s, matters changed greatly with the landmark Supreme Court
ruling in Brown v. Board of Education.' That decision not only sig-
naled the constitutional invalidity of all existing forms of Jim Crow
segregation; many have long perceived it as expressing a renewed
commitment to conceptions of racial equality throughout American
law. Though it did not eliminate all uses of racial classifications in
state and federal statutes, it did seem to end the longstanding role of
the law in constructing American racial identities as a system of white
supremacy. One might think, in fact, that it represented a retreat
16 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
17 Fran Lisa Bun tman, Race, Reputation, and the Supreme Court: Valuing Blackness and Whiteness,
56 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1, 3 (2001).
18 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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from using the law to define racial identities and statuses in the
United States altogether.
Yet because courts and lawmakers at the time of Brown and ever
since have confronted a society that remains massively shaped by the
consequences of past racial constructions, they have never been able
to avoid adopting some stance, however implicit, toward America's
existing racial groupings. Those stances inescapably convey some
sense of what "race" is and should be in America today, and it is those
conceptions I seek to discover and analyze here.
There are doubtless a great number of racial conceptions that can
be discerned in modern American legislative histories, statutory lan-
guage, and judicial rulings, but two appear particularly prominent.
Both take as their starting point the historic opinion by Chief Justice
Earl Warren in the original Brown decision. From 1954 to the pre-
sent, many federal judges have continued to cite Warren's reasoning
about race favorably, none more frequently or influentially than Jus-
tice Thurgood Marshall, who as an advocate helped shape Warren's
ruling in the case and who as a jurist sought, with very mixed success,
to keep Brown's spirit alive. They are the proponents of what I call
the "damaged race" conception of American racial identities.
But in the last two decades, other judges have explicitly criticized
the aspects of Warren's opinion that most clearly express this concep-
tion, none more frequently or influentially than Marshall's successor,
Justice Clarence Thomas. Throughout his career, Justice Thomas has
consistently championed what I term the "racial irrelevance" concep-
tion of the place of race in American law, which he refers to as "color-
blind" constitutionalism. To grasp these opposing conceptions, it is
useful to begin with what ChiefJustice Earl Warren wrote in Brown.
Doing so is not so simple as one might expect. Chief Justice War-
ren's remarkably brief opinion includes no definitions of "races" or
"racial groups." It takes their existence for granted. Warren fre-
quently and unselfconsciously refers to "the Negro race" and to "Ne-
gro" and "white" children.' 9 Though by 1954 the concept of biologi-
cal races had been under attack for years by anthropologists Franz
Boas, Ruth Benedict, Ashley Montagu and others, and though the po-
litical environment of the 1950s fostered new receptivity to those ar-
guments, most Americans had gone no further than to begin to think
of the "races" as ancestral cultural identities so firmly established as to
be relatively fixed. ° In any case, Chief Justice Warren chose not to
19 Id. at 487, 490.
20 See, e.g., DAVID A.J. RICHARDS, CONSCIENCE AND THE CONSTITUTION: HISTORY, THEORYAND
LAW OF THE RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS 156-70 (1993) (attacking racial theory as scientifi-
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delve into debates over race as a legal classification; contrary to many
later interpretations, he does not even say racial classifications are
"suspect." On its face, the Brown decision is not nearly so much about
racial equality as it is about educational equality.
Even so, Warren's opinion does highlight how governmental edu-
cational policies and practices have shaped at least one racial group,
African-Americans, and it presents them as a severely damaged race.
His arguments on this point have been so widely cited for so long that
for many, the phrases have acquired almost the historical grandeur of
the speeches of Lincoln or the central clauses of the Constitution it-
self. To others, however, they have always seemed deeply offensive.
ChiefJustice Warren begins by contending that:
[E]ducation is perhaps the most important function of state and local
governments .... It is the very foundation of good citizenship. Today it
is a principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, in
preparing him for later professional training, and in helping him to ad-
just normally to his environment.2'
Without an adequate education, "it is doubtful that any child may
reasonably be expected to succeed in life. '2 That is why, when the
state undertakes to provide education, it must "be made available to
all on equal terms. 2
But, Warren next argues, the requirement of equality is not met
by school systems segregating children by race. That practice de-
prives "the children of the minority group of equal educational op-
portunities., 24 Warren adds nothing here or elsewhere in the opinion
about segregation's effects on the "majority group," nor was this a
theme in any of the briefs submitted to the Court. Instead, next and
most monumentally, the opinion specifies just how the education of
minority children is hampered: "To separate them from others of
similar age and qualifications solely because of their race generates a
feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community that may af-
fect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone.,
2
1
How are their hearts and minds affected? Citing the African-
American sociologist Kenneth Clark, Warren wrote that "[a] sense of
cally unsound). Mark Weiner examines what he terms the new "ethno-juridical" conceptions of
race visible in the Brown decision in Mark Stuart Weiner, Race, Citizenship and Culture in American
Law, 1883-1954: Ethno-Juridical Discourse from Crow Dog to Brown v. Board of Education, Publica-
tion (forthcoming 2003) (manuscript at 230-72, on file with Yale University Library).
21 Brown, 347 U.S. at 493.
22 Id.
23 Id.
24 Id.
25 Id. at 494.
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inferiority affects the motivation of a child to learn. Segregation with
the sanction of law, therefore, has a tendency to [retard] the educa-
tional and mental development of negro children."26 That is why
"[s] eparate educational facilities are inherently unequal."
27
There can be little doubt that this reasoning stemmed in large
part from a humane and sympathetic awareness that segregation was
unjustly injurious to many black Americans. It is also certain that
Chief Justice Warren felt legally impelled to find that segregation
harmed blacks in some way in order to hold that it denied them
equal protection of the laws. Yet as many critics have long con-
tended, on their face Warren's words present a devastating picture of
black Americans raised under segregation. As a group, he suggests,
they have comparatively little motivation to learn, resulting in the re-
tardation of their "mental development." Their educational short-
comings mean they are deficient in "the very foundation of good citi-
zenship," in their "cultural values," in their readiness for professional
training, and in all their abilities simply to "adjust normally" to soci-
ety.6 These maladjusted, educationally retarded persons cannot "rea-
sonably be expected to succeed in life., 29 And all these conditions
represent harms to their hearts and minds that are "unlikely ever to
be undone."3 It is not their fault, and it is not due to biological infe-
riority. The problem is the governmentally created segregated edu-
cation system. Still, as Chief Justice Warren describes them, black
Americans are in many very important respects severely damaged,
and they are likely to remain so. It also follows that even if their chil-
dren are not educated in legally segregated schools, they will still be
raised by severely damaged parents. It is not hard to see how this fact
might raise questions about how those children are likely to fare, and
about those children's children.
Read literally, then, the Brown opinion can seem a scathing dero-
gation of the capabilities of most American blacks living in 1954 and
for many years to come, right up to the present. It is therefore un-
derstandable that in their 1967 manifesto, Black Power, Stokely Carmi-
chael and Charles Hamilton denounced such reasoning as reinforc-
ing "among both black and white, the idea that 'white' is
automatically superior and 'black' is by definition inferior."31 For this
26 Id.
27 Id. at 495.
28 Id. at 493.
29 Id.
30 Id. at 494.
31 STOKELY CARMICHAEL & CHARLES V. HAMILTON, BLACK POWER: THE POLITICS OF
LIBERATION IN AMERICA 54 (1967).
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reason, they charged, "'integration' is a subterfuge for the mainte-
nance of white supremacy."3 In a similar spirit, many legal scholars
have since sharply criticized Brown for, in Michael Middleton's words,
"perpetuat[ing] the myth of Black inferiority" even as it sought to
oppose it. 3 Perhaps most prominently, Derrick Bell, whose work has
done so much to inspire Critical Race scholarship, has long attacked
the notion that the presence of white students per se forms an ade-
quate or appropriate remedy for the harms inflicted by the Jim Crow
34
system. 3
Though they clearly have strong foundations, at times such criti-
cisms have gone too far by failing to acknowledge that Chief Justice
Warren attributed black inferiority strictly to de jure segregation, not
to anything that he depicted as truly inherent in black identity. I
nonetheless believe that he portrayed the harms done to blacks as
deeper, more pervasive, and most of all, as far more ineradicable
than he had any justification for doing. But it is also only fair to rec-
ognize, as all these legal scholars do, that in the circumstances of the
case, these negative characterizations of American blacks were diffi-
cult to avoid. Again, to rule that segregation was denying equal pro-
tection, Warren had to rule that it was in some way harming blacks,
not "protecting" them, and that in so doing, it was not really treating
them "equally" to whites. If there had been no harm, or perhaps
even if there had been equal harms, then arguably there would have
been no constitutional foul. Still, in reasoning the way he did, there
can be no denying that Warren said much that could be construed as
implying that those blacks educated in segregated systems were, and
were likely to remain, substantially inferior to whites. Presenting
blacks as the "damaged race" could easily seem, in short, still to pre-
sent whites as the "superior race."
One might ask how Chief Justice Warren could possibly have
avoided this result, while still reaching the result he most wanted: the
constitutional invalidation of racial segregation. I have long favored
the view that Warren should have rested his case not on the history of
the Fourteenth Amendment and the intent of its framers, nor on
32 Id.
33 Michael A. Middleton, Brown v. Board: Revisited, 20 S. ILL. U. L.J. 19, 31 (1995). See also
John Sibley Butler, The Return of Open Debate, SOC'Y, Mar./Apr. 1996, at 11-18 (questioning both
the logic of Brown, which held that "separate but equal" was inherently unequal and not simply
unconstitutional, and Brown's impact on the black population of America).
34 See Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client Interests in School De-
segregation Litigation, 85 YALE L.J. 470 (1976) (discussing problems with racial balancing reme-
dies and noting that racial "mixing" does not necessarily make black schools more educationally
effective, or change attitudes and beliefs about racial inferiority).
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contemporary social psychological studies. A more reliable founda-
tion was available in the legislative history of school segregation laws
as elements in the Jim Crow system that spread after Plessy. Many
southern, white lawmakers were not particularly discreet. There is an
abundance of evidence that they explicitly advanced Jim Crow laws as
a means to restore what they regarded as the just and natural system
of white supremacy. Many legislators openly acknowledged that
"separate but equal" provisions were only legal fig leafs to get around
the Fourteenth amendment's misguided Equal Protection Clause,
and when it came to the distribution of political and legal power, they
did not risk even "separate but equal" arrangements. Using other
means, they labored mightily and largely successfully to exclude
blacks from the franchise and from juries. Neither in intent nor ef-
fect were segregation laws aimed at "equal protection" for African-
Americans.
Still, that line of argument had several disadvantages that may
have deterred Chief Justice Warren. As the twentieth century pro-
ceeded, more legislators were careful to profess their sincere belief in
the benefits of segregation for both races, so the historical evidence
of discriminatory intent, while clear on balance, was disputable.37
And however accurate, such an imputation of invidious intentions to
southern lawmakers would also have been politically explosive-
though they railed against the decision with near-unanimity anyway.
In addition, ruling in this way would not have clearly established that,
even absent white supremacist aims, "separate but equal" was inher-
ently unconstitutional, as the NAACP Legal Defense Fund lawyers
wished the Court to do." They hoped to avoid having to sue each
school district and public institution to prove that segregation was
unconstitutional as practiced in every particular locale. Finally,
though such reasoning would have dwelt on legislative history more
than psychological and educational consequences, it would still have
involved the claim that segregation harmed blacks in ways that were
35 See, e.g., Rogers M. Smith, The Inherent Deceptiveness of Constitutional Discourse: A Diagnosis
and Prescription, in INTEGRITY AND CONSCIENCE 218, 242 (Ian Shapiro & Robert Adams eds.,
1998) (arguing that Brown was not well-grounded in terms of the Fourteenth Amendment's
original intent).
36 See, e.g., PHILIP A. KLINKNER WITH ROGERS M. SMITH, THE UNSTEADY MARCH: THE RISE AND
DECLINE OF RACIAL EQUALITY IN AMERICA 94 (1999) (noting that while laws were written in race-
neutral language to evade constitutional challenges, their intent was clearly to discriminate and
eventually eliminate black voters). See generally id. at 88-105.
37 See, e.g., RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLEJUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD OFEDUCATION
AND BLACK AMERICA'S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY 334-35 (1976).
58 See id. at 645-46.
39 See id.
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not true of whites. Hence, though its rhetoric might have been less
disturbing to racial egalitarians, it might still have been possible to
read into the Brown opinion an implication of enduring white superi-
ority.
But is that implication really there? To answer that question, we
must consider a further topic that has been much less discussed in
the vast literature on the case: the question of how the Brown opinion
implicitly presents or constructs white identities. As Kevin Brown has
noted, "[flor the Court to have avoided replicating the message
about the inferiority of African-Americans in desegregation, the
Court would have also articulated how de jure segregation harmed
Caucasians as well., 4  Many readers of the opinion, certainly many
critics, probably many supporters, and perhaps Warren himself, have
often assumed that it implies just the opposite.4' Because blacks are
portrayed as harmed or damaged by segregation, the logical corol-
lary, they understandably infer, is that whites must be conceived of as
the "unharmed" or "undamaged," and thus superior, race. Segre-
gated education must have rendered them comparatively more moti-
vated to learn, better educated in the foundations of good citizen-
ship, in cultural values, more ready for later professional training,
and superior in their abilities to adjust normally to social life.
To be sure, both subsequent commentators and litigants have
sometimes contended that, although ChiefJustice Warren did not say
so, in fact segregated schooling was not really good for whites or
blacks, and that both continue to gain from integrated education.42
But the most frequent theme in support of this claim has been that
all people benefit educationally from a racially diverse student body.
The University of Michigan has especially stressed this argument in its
ongoing efforts to defend the affirmative action admissions policies
of its undergraduate and law programs in litigation that is before the
40 Kevin Brown, The Legal Rhetorical Structure for the Conversion of Desegregation Lawsuits to Qual-
ity Education Lawsuits, 42 EMORY L.J. 791, 816 (1993).
41 See Sally Ackerman, The White Supremacist Status Quo: How the American Legal System Perpetu-
ates Racism As Seen Through the Lens of Property Law, 21 HAMLINEJ. PUB. L. & POL'Y 137, 152-57
(1999) (discussing the Brown Court's assumption that black children feel inferior to white chil-
dren, without addressing the equally detrimental effect of segregation on white children).
42 See, e.g., Wendy Brown-Scott, Justice Thurgood Marshall and the Integrative Ideal, 26 ARIZ. ST.
L.J. 535, 545-46 (1994) (claiming that although Thurgood Marshall argued that segregation
injured white children, the Court ignored evidence of the detrimental effects of segregation on
white children); Middleton, supra note 33, at 29 n.45 ("More recently, advocates have argued
that segregation also produces educational deficits in majority group children as well.").
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United States Supreme Court as I write this article.43 Yet to assert the
splendors of diversity in general is not enough to come to grips with
the ways de jure segregation, and modem judicial decisions, have
constructed white racial identities, nor is it enough to grasp what
must be done to address the harms of those constructions. We need
to focus not only on diversity, but on the specific shortcomings of the
processes of socialization that whites commonly experience, in order
to make the case for the special desirability of racial diversity.
To do so, we need to recognize first that it is in fact not logical to
infer on the basis of Brown's reasoning that segregated education
made whites, on balance, genuinely superior to blacks. That reason-
ing is, I submit, more logically read to imply that those the law
treated as "whites" were also damaged by Jim Crow segregation-not
in the same ways, but in ways that are nonetheless enormously signifi-
cant.
44
To see why, we should ask, what message did segregation laws
convey to white students about their "status in the community?" In
all likelihood, many whites understood those laws to indicate that the
authorities governing their society regarded them as the intrinsically
superior race and were prepared to extend to them superior oppor-
tunities and advantages. That, after all, was the case. What are the
probable consequences of such understandings? I think it likely that
many whites readily concluded that the government was correct to
treat them in this favored fashion, just as most recipients of any sort
of favorable recognition, however unwarranted, tend to do. Whites
educated in segregated schools were, then, likely to believe in a false
myth of the greater intrinsic worth of their race. And even those who
did not really believe in their own superiority surely felt some sense of
investment, of psychological and material attachment to, perhaps
even dependence on, the ideologies and institutions that accorded
them privileged status. Indeed, those who doubted their own superi-
ority might well have had such feelings most strongly. But whether
43 For the most recent lower court decision, see Grutter v. Bollinger, 288 F. 3d 732, 735-37 (6th
Cir. 2002) (discussing the law school's goal of enrolling a diverse class and the various factors
considered for admission).
44 I do not mean that whites have been damaged in ways that might justify lawsuits seeking
redress for torts inflicted upon them. I use "damages" here interchangeably with "harms" and
simply mean to suggest that in considering how to respond to the range of enduring harms re-
sulting from de jure segregation, policymakers and judges should recognize that there have
been distinctive harms to those legally labeled "white" as well as to those labeled "black."
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one sees oneself as superior or needy, to be treated in such a fashion
is clearly very tempting and widely desired. "s
Still, do we really want to say that such an education advances the
civic aims that Warren argued modern public education systems must
do? Do we really regard an education that fosters a sense of one's ra-
cial superiority and of one's material and psychological stake in sus-
taining white supremacy as an education in "good citizenship?"
Would we deem this an education in appropriate "cultural values,"
preparing white students for desirable performance in professional
careers or "normal," well-adjusted social existence?
I suggest not. I think it is more logical to see such beliefs and psy-
chological and material attachments and dependencies, and the rac-
ist behavior they are likely to spawn, as representing forms of bad citi-
zenship, harmful cultural values, and as damaging professional and
social conduct. If so, the correct conclusion is that the reasoning in
Brown, fully pursued, implies that segregated education was damaging
for whites-indeed, in many cases deeply corrupting and debilitat-
ing-even as it more obviously and materially damaged blacks. The
damages are very different. There is still nothing genuinely "equal"
about "separate but equal" as practiced in the Jim Crow era. But
there is also not really any "protection," not even for many of the core
interests of those designated "white," because their racial identities
are being constructed in ways that ultimately harm them.
I fully recognize that this may seem a rather bizarre, perhaps silly
claim. The inescapable reality is that whites received special educa-
tional advantages and vastly greater economic, political, and social
opportunities under segregation. They were undeniably a greatly
privileged class. How can that be regarded as harmful?
I believe it was harmful in two basic ways, though I concede that I
cannot provide irrefutable evidence for either of them. First, even
though segregation did indeed give whites some real material bene-
fits, I am not persuaded that it actually made them better off in mate-
rial terms than they would have been in a more genuinely free and
equal economy and society. As libertarian (though not social) con-
servatives have long argued, and as scholars on the left have recently
affirmed, segregation was economically costly.46 It prevented many
45 I am grateful to Katharine Jackson for elaborating this line of argument in my "Race,
Ethnicity, and American Constitutional Politics" seminar at the University of Pennsylvania in the
spring of 2002 in ways that have influenced my thinking in this essay.
46 See, e.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION LAWS (1992); JOE R. FEAGIN & HERNAN VERA, WHITE RACISM: THE BASICS
(1995). I am grateful to Jane Gordon for calling Feagin and Vera's analysis to my attention.
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black Americans from fully developing their talents and realizing
their productive potential. It stifled profitable economic transactions
many might otherwise have undertaken. And it required ongoing,
often costly coercive enforcement to overcome the angry resistance it
engendered, and to quiet the guilty fears it bred. It is, quite simply,
expensive and inefficient to maintain stability in a society built upon
volatile foundations of hatred and repression. Whether these various
costs actually made segregation less materially advantageous to the
whites who were privileged by it is a complex empirical question that
I cannot resolve here. But it is, at a minimum, not silly to think that
even in material terms, most whites who thought they were better off
under Jim Crow than they would have been without it may well have
been short-sighted-and that they were made so in part by the delu-
sion-filled segregated education they had received.
The second harm they experienced is impossible to substantiate
with material evidence, but I believe it was real nonetheless. When a
segregated education led many whites to shape their lives and con-
duct around the vicious myth of their intrinsic racial superiority,
when it made many of them feel psychologically and materially de-
pendent on the maintenance of radically unjust institutions, I think
that it did them severe moral damage. From a moral point of view,
there can be nothing beneficial about living a lie, or about grounding
one's existence on the perpetuation of injustices. Those who believe
these things to be good and morally defensible must be viewed as
profoundly flawed.
So though I would like to have had the opinion written very dif-
ferently, I believe Warren was right to argue that segregation signifi-
cantly harmed black Americans, even if he greatly exaggerated how
ineradicable those harms were. But we should also say that segrega-
tion damaged whites too, in different ways, to be sure, but nonethe-
less in ways that mean we cannot see it as having left them, on bal-
ance, the "superior" race. Instead, segregation damaged all
Americans in ways that made no one better off than they would have
been without it. And it left legacies of harm that all Americans have
an interest in overcoming. For if it is plausible to think that the con-
strained opportunities afforded to many black Americans for so many
years have had consequences lasting to the present, then it is equally
plausible to believe that the false senses of entitlement and the de-
pendency on social privileging to which whites were long accustomed
have also had lasting effects. In my view, segregation did indeed pro-
duce not a "damaged race" but extensive "distinct racial damages"
that have burdened the lives of all, in ways that we still need to ad-
dress.
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But that is not the argument Warren made in Brown, nor, indeed,
is it one that American courts have since endorsed in any very clear
and full fashion. Instead, a Lexis-Nexis search indicates that many
justices on the "liberal" side of the constitutional and political spec-
trum on racial issues, from Abe Fortas and William Brennan through
Harry Blackmun and David Souter, have long continued to articulate
the more one-sided "damaged race" view, often citing the famous
passages in Brown discussed above.47 Kevin Brown confirms that, even
when these particular phrases are not invoked, many opinions con-
tinue to suggest that black Americans have been stunted in their
mental and educational development due to de jure segregation and
its consequences.48 Wendy Brown-Scott has shown how Justice Thur-
good Marshall, in particular, remained wedded to the "stigmatic in-
jury theory" of the damages to blacks from segregated education all
through his career. 9 He cited it repeatedly. During his last term on
the Court, he contended in his passionate dissent from the Court's
abandonment of demanding desegregation remedies in Board of Edu-
cation v. Dowell, that remedying the "evil" done to black "hearts and
minds" and "preventing its recurrence were the motivations animat-
ing"0 the Court in its most aggressive desegregation decisions, Green
v. County School Board' and Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of
Education.2 For him, the "damaged race" conception of black identity
continued to be fundamental to his understanding of race in Amer-
ica. He believed, moreover, that it justified ongoing, affirmative gov-
ernmental action to assist black Americans through a wide variety of
race-conscious measures. It is on that point that proponents of the
"damaged race" view differ most sharply from those advocating its
leading rival, the "color-blind" or "racial irrelevance" conception.
47 See, e.g., Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 1055 (1996) (Souter,J., dissenting); Hudson v. McMil-
lian, 503 U.S 1, 16-17 (1992) (Blackmun,J., concurring in judgment); Evans v. Abney, 396 U.S.
435, 454 (1970) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474, 498 n.2
(1968) (Fortas,J., dissenting). A Lexis-Nexis search conducted by FerdousJahan also identified
forty-seven lower federal court cases that explicitly cited the damaged "hearts and minds" sec-
tions of Brown, usually as authoritative for equal protection analysis. A much larger number of
cases refer to these themes in Brown without citing the specific sentences.
48 Brown, supra note 40, at 809-12.
49 Brown-Scott, supra note 42, at 543-49.
50 Bd. of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 252 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting). Marshall also
explicitly cited the passages under discussion in Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 376 n.8 (1981)
(Marshall, J., dissenting); City of Memphis v. Greene, 451 U.S. 100, 153 (1981) (Marshall, J., dis-
senting); Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 503 n.2 (1977);Jefferson Parish School Board v. Dan-
dridge, 404 U.S. 1219, 1220 (1971), and he referred to this reasoning indirectly on many other
occasions.
51 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
52 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
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III. AGAINST STIGMA: THE "RACIAL IRRELEVANCE" CONCEPTION
By the time Justice Marshall invoked Brown's view of the harms of
segregation for the last time in 1991, he and others had become ac-
customed to doing so in dissent. And from that time to the present, a
majority of the bench has been increasingly inclined to embrace the
view of equal protection long articulated, on and off the bench, by
the jurist who followed Marshall on to the high court, Justice Cla-
rence Thomas. Though his position has shifted over time in one im-
portant respect, Thomas has been a vocal critic of Warren's reasoning
in Brown and the "damaged race" view ever since he first came to pub-
lic prominence as Chairman of the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC).
In his EEOC days, Thomas contended that Warren's account of
how black Americans were psychologically harmed by de jure segre-
gation represented the "great flaw" in a decision that was correct in
its result, but wrongly justified.55 That flaw, he argued, made Brown a
"missed opportunity," like "all its progeny, whether they involve bus-
ing, affirmative action, or redistricting. 5 4 Thomas maintained that
the Court should simply have followed Justice Harlan's famed dissent
in Plessy v. Ferguson and its argument that our Constitution is "color-
blind." The Court should have declared that de jure segregation
violated basic individual freedoms guaranteed to all by the Constitu-
tion and also the higher law principles invoked in the Declaration of
Independence. 6 After his ascent to the Supreme Court, Thomas has
continued to decry the part of the Brown decision on which Marshall
most relied. But in his most extensive assault on Brown, his concur-
rence in Missouri v. Jenkins, Justice Thomas contended that it is actu-
ally a "misreading" of Brown to say that the decision rested on claims
of educationally-inflicted psychological harms to blacks. 7 Instead,
Thomas sought to identify other grounds for the decision, and he in-
sisted that Brown "did not need to rely upon any psychological or so-
cial-science research" to find de jure racial segregation unconstitu-
tional-though he offered no explanation for why the Court had so
centrally emphasized the arguments he had himself previously
5 Clarence Thomas, An Afro-American Perspective: Toward a "Plain Reading" of the Constitu-
tion-The Declaration of Independence in Constitutional Interpretation, 30 HOW. L.J. 983, 990 (1987).
54 Id. at 991.
55 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan,J., dissenting).
56 See Clarence Thomas, The Higher Law Background of the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, 12 HARV.J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 63, 68 (1989).
57 Missouri v.Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 114, 119 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring).
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stressed." He did charge quite explicitly that the notion that segrega-
tion "retards" the "mental and educational development" of African-
Americans "not only relies upon questionable social science research
rather than constitutional principle, but it also rests on an assump-
tion of black inferiority. ,59 Hence it could not be understood to be
consistent with the principle of human equality that he has always
seen as the true foundation for the result in Brown.
Thomas has sought to disavow what he now calls the prevalent
"misreading" of Brown precisely because figures like Marshall have
used the psychological harm argument to contend that law and pub-
lic policy must recognize blacks as still in need of special public assis-
tance, in the form of mandatory school desegregation, affirmative ac-
tion, remedial majority-minority districting, and other race-conscious
measures.60  Thomas does not simply regard all those positions and
their underlying philosophy as inconsistent with a genuine commit-
ment to equal human rights. He also believes they are profoundly
damaging to black Americans. He has objected that "the Brown psy-
chology" falsely treats "the legal and social environment" as "all-
controlling" in shaping human behavior.6' Such reasoning leads to
what Thomas has denounced as "the victim plague, 62 and the "ideol-
ogy of victimhood,"' which he defines as "the practice of blaming cir-
cumstances for one's situation rather than taking responsibility for
changing things for the better."
64
58 Id. at 120. Thomas sought to reconcile his support for Brown, his originalist jurispru-
dence, and his dismissal of claims of psychological harm by citing Michael W. McConnell,
Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions, 81 VA. L. REV. 947 (1995). I have argued that McCon-
nell's "originalist" defense of Brown is unconvincing, as it relies mostly on congressional discus-
sions from the 1870s, after the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified, discussions concerned with
congressional power to ban certain forms of racial segregation, not judicial authority to do so.
For that critique and McConnell's reply, see Smith, supra note 35, and Michael W. McConnell,
The Asymmetricality of Constitutional Discourse, in INTEGRITY AND CONSCIENCE 300 (Ian Shapiro &
Robert Adams eds., 1998). McConnell contends there that the fact that no Congressman ever
mentioned any judicial authority to ban any form of segregation under the amendment (as op-
posed to bans on exclusions of blacks) is "beside the point." Id. at 312. I find this contention,
that anything Congress has discretion to do under Section Five can also be required by the
courts as a constitutional mandate, rather preposterous and unlikely to be defended by
McConnell in most contexts.
59 Jenkins, 515 U.S. at 114 (Thomas, J., concurring).
60 Id. at 119.
61 Thomas, supra note 56, at 991.
62 The Hon. Clarence Thomas, Victims and Heroes in the "Benevolent State," Address at the
Eighth Annual Federalist Society Lawyers Convention, in 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 671, 671
(1996).
63 Id. at 675.
64 Id. at 671.
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This ideology infuriates Thomas. He has repeatedly condemned
it scornfully, asserting that "the very notion of submitting to one's cir-
cumstances was unthinkable in the household in which I was
raised."6 He also contends that because of the sort of reasoning War-
ren advanced in Brown, "our political and legal systems now actively
encourage people to claim victim status and to make demands on so-
ciety for reparations and recompense., 6  Thomas does not repudiate
these demands because he sees American societv as "free from intrac-
table and very saddening injustice and harm. That, he accepts, is
simply not true. Yet, he contends, "the idea that government can be
the primary instrument for the elimination of misfortune is a funda-
mental misunderstanding of the human condition., 69 We can "never
eliminate oppression or adversity completely, though we can and
should fight injustice as best we can."7 ° But Justice Thomas believes
that to foist that task on government instead of taking it on ourselves,
to see ourselves as victims who need governmental assistance to suc-
ceed, "destroys the human spirit. 7 1 It denies "the very attributes that
are at the core of human dignity," especially "the ability to endure
adversity and to use it for gain."
7
The only way that law can help black Americans, Thomas believes,
is to abandon giving any explicit legal recognition or standing to ra-
cial identities at all. Governments must treat race as simply irrelevant
for all purposes of public policy, except for the enforcement of laws
that encode this principle of "racial irrelevance" by outlawing specific
acts of racial discrimination. In his concurring opinion in Missouri v.
Jenkins, written with a passion equal to that of Justice Marshall in
Board of Education v. Dowell, Thomas writes that "[a] t the heart" of his
view of the Equal Protection Clause "lies the principle that the gov-
ernment must treat citizens as individuals, and not as members of ra-
cial, ethnic, or religious groups."7 If the law does not treat race as ir-
relevant, if it is not color-blind, if it permits forms of special assistance
for blacks, Thomas believes it will be in effect perpetuating false, de-
structive beliefs in black inferiority and white superiority, and worse,
encouraging a "victim plague" among black Americans that will make
65 Id.
Id. at 672-73.
67 Id. at 682.
68 See id.
69 Id.
70 Id.
71 Id.
72 Id.
73 Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 120-21 (1995) (Thomas,J., concurring).
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those views seem true.7 ' Those are consequences which Justice Tho-
mas cannot abide. Many members of the current Supreme Court ap-
pear to accord Thomas's views on racial issues generally special re-
spect, and it is likely that a majority now agrees with him on all these
points.
Though Thomas believes the law should not treat people in terms
of racial categories, he is vividly aware that racial identities remain
important social realities in American life. What does his "color-
blind," "racial irrelevance" view imply for how we should conceive of
those black and white racial identities today? By rejecting the "dam-
aged race" position, Thomas proudly implies that African-Americans
stand today and have long stood fundamentally undamaged and un-
bowed, able to succeed on their own merits, without any governmen-
tal aid. As I have noted, he proffers this view of black Americans de-
spite his vivid awareness that racial injustices have long existed and
still exist in the United States. He believes the best way to combat
those injustices is to adopt a distinctive attitude toward American ra-
cism that represents, I think, a contemporary version of what W. E. B.
Du Bois famously termed the "double consciousness" of black Ameri-
cans. 76 In Thomas's version, African-Americans must both affirm and
deny that anti-black racism is a major factor in their lives. They must
recognize and fight against specific acts of racism whenever they en-
counter them. Yet they must also always act as if racism is not a ma-
jor, systematic barrier to their ability to get ahead on their own. If
they do not act that way, then they allow racism to demoralize and de-
feat them, to deprive them of dignity, to make them victims-and
Thomas refuses, and believes all blacks should refuse, to let that hap-
pen.
There is clearly much that is understandable and much that is
commendable, indeed inspirational, in this view of contemporary
black identity. Like Nietzsche's invocation of "noble" morality in
place of "slave" moralities, it can spur people to strive for and to
achieve much more than they might otherwise do.77 And again, that
includes resisting specific expressions of racism. Thomas is not rec-
ommending any form of acquiescence: his form of "double con-
sciousness," which sees race as something that both is and is not im-
74 Thomas, supra note 62, at 671.
7"5 Though he maintains that we already have what we should see as a "color-blind Constitu-
tion," he does not pretend that we have a "color-blind society," though he suggests that as a
goal. Thomas, supra note 53, at 992 n.37.
76 W. E. B. Du BOIS, THE SOULS OF BLACK FOLK 3 (1903).
77 NIETZSCHE, supra note 6, at 36-39.
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portant to African-Americans, cannot fairly be interpreted as urging
blacks to endure acts of racial injustice passively, in "Uncle Tom"
fashion.
But now let us ask, as we did of Warren's "damaged race" view in
Brown: what does this "racial irrelevance" conception imply for how
we should think of white racial identities today? Here, the logical
corollary seems to be that whites should think of themselves with a
perfectly symmetrical form of double consciousness. They should be
aware that racism, including anti-black racism, exists and they should
oppose it whenever they encounter concrete expressions of it. Yet
they should not think of it as pervasive; they should see whites, like
blacks, as fundamentally an "undamaged race," not scarred by any
legacies of past legal systems of white supremacy. Instead, they, too,
should think of themselves as living in a society in which every indi-
vidual has a substantially equal opportunity, and responsibility, to get
ahead on his or her own merits. That, they should believe, is how
most white people, like most black people, actually succeed in Amer-
ica.
7
1
When we surface this conception of white identity as an implica-
tion of Thomas's "racial irrelevance" or "color-blind" legal view, I
think we can see how, despite its real attractions, it is in the end a du-
bious guide to understanding the place of race in America's past and
present. To sustain his depiction of the United States as basically a
genuinely equal opportunity, color-blind political system, Thomas is
driven to mischaracterize American constitutional history and, I be-
lieve, current realities, painting them as less damaging to blacks and
whites than they actually have been and are. He feels compelled to
endorse what is, sadly, probably the unduly optimistic view of Abra-
ham Lincoln and Frederick Douglass, that "the Founders" meant for
their Constitution to put slavery on the path to "eventual abolition."
79
He also grasps hopefully at Michael McConnell's very strained claim
that we can understand the powers the Fourteenth Amendment
78 Here again, we can imagine a different, to my mind more logical, inference. If Thomas's
view implies that blacks should think of themselves as subjected to specific acts of discrimina-
tion, but not as systematically prevented from succeeding on their merits, the reverse implica-
tion might well be that whites should see themselves as succeeding on their merits in certain
regards, but as still the often-involuntary beneficiaries of systemic inequities. That view would
be similar to what I am terming the "distinct racial damages" conception, for it would similarly
suggest that we need to address systemic injustices, though it would not feature notions of dam-
aged white identities to the same extent. It is clear, however, that this is not the corollary that
Justice Thomas draws: he insists we must dismiss all claims of systemic group disadvantages and
focus strictly on individuals.
79 Thomas, supra note 56, at 64-66.
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framers meant to give to courts by examining, not what they collec-
tively said or did in 1868 (when they passed the Amendment and also
funded segregated schools in the District of Columbia), but by what
many of them said Congress should do in the 1870s.s° And Thomas
has come to abandon his own earlier recognition that the Brown
opinion did indeed rest on the psychological "damaged race" view he
despises, in favor of a pretension that it somehow relies instead on
grounds the Court did not advance.
Thomas is driven to these inaccuracies, I believe, because other-
wise he would have to recognize that the original Constitution, the
Fourteenth Amendment, and indeed Brown itself all did in some ways
countenance and perpetuate notions of racial inferiority. If Thomas
were to acknowledge that, he could perhaps still insist that govern-
mental aid is no part of the answer to the problems of black Ameri-
cans. But he could not so easily claim that America has been and is a
political system in which, despite individual acts of racism and some
mistaken governmental policies, most blacks are able and have long
been able to succeed on their own merits.
Yet even if Thomas's "racial irrelevance" view pushes him toward
rather rose-tinted views of American political and legal history, we
might still reasonably conclude that this is a small price to pay. His
position may well help many African-Americans resist demoralization,
and it also treats whites in generous and respectful ways that are not
likely to provoke racial anger and division.
I fear, however, that Thomas's position actually has different,
more destructive consequences. The undeniable reality is that Amer-
ica is still a society marked by sharp racial inequalities-in wealth, in
housing, in the holding of political offices, in educational attain-
ments, in memberships in the professions, in life expectancy, in re-
gard to virtually every arena of conventional success that we can
name, apart from professional athletics and the military."' In such a
society, what does it mean to say to whites that race is not something
that really gets in the way of any individual's advancement, and that it
has nothing to do with their own individual successes? What are the
likely results of telling whites that they need not see themselves as in
any way "damaged," so that they can trust themselves not to permit
any advantages they may possess as the result of racial discrimination
to bias their judgments about appropriate public policies? What is
80 Missouri v.Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 120 (1995) (Thomas,J., concurring).
8 See, e.g., ANDREW HACKER, TWO NATIONS: BLACK AND WHITE, SEPARATE, HOSTILE,
UNEQUAL (1995) (using statistical analysis to demonstrate racial disparities in major areas of
American life and why these divisions still persist).
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the probable impact of conveying to them that they are unlikely to
have received any unjust benefits from, or to be in any way invested
in, American racial inequalities which, after all, have not really been
all that oppressive anyway?
At a minimum, I think such messages are likely to foster compla-
cency and indifference toward persisting racial inequalities among
whites. At worst, they may foster an even more pernicious conclu-
sion: since there are no major obstacles to blacks getting ahead on
their merits in American society, then the extensive existing array of
racial inequalities must simply be due to the fact that whites do, after
all, possess superior qualities. I am afraid that the "color-blind," "ra-
cial irrelevance" view that Justice Thomas has long persistently advo-
cated has indeed had both these consequences: it has helped many
whites to feel comfortably complacent about American racial prob-
lems, and it has permitted some to continue to believe in white supe-
riority. That has certainly not been Thomas's intention, just as it was
not the intention of Earl Warren to brand blacks as ineradicably infe-
rior. But it may well be the effect of Justice Thomas' conception of
racial identities, which is now being extensively incorporated into
American law.
If so, then I believe we must conclude that neither of these domi-
nant understandings of race in modern American law is satisfactory.
If we stress, with Warren and Marshall, that the law should recognize
that racial discrimination has harmed blacks in ways that support
race-conscious remedies, we may perpetuate notions of blacks as the
damaged and inferior race. If we stress, with Thomas, that the law
should treat race as irrelevant, we may perpetuate beliefs that gov-
ernment need do nothing about racial inequalities, that any prob-
lems blacks may have are basically their own fault, and that the supe-
rior socioeconomic positions that whites visibly possess are due to
their superior merits. Either way, we still seem to be constructing ra-
cial identities through laws in ways that reflect and reinforce notions
of white superiority.
IV. A THIRD WAY-"DISTINCT RACIAL DAMAGES"
How might we do better? Perhaps we can do so by building on my
earlier suggestion that, in reality, segregation should be seen not only
as having harmed blacks, but also as having, in different ways, harmed
whites-by making whites feel attached to, invested in, even depend-
ent on, a set of unjust privileges that ultimately were deeply damaging
to American society as a whole. If we see modern white racial identi-
ties as having been constructed in those terms, then it cannot be ap-
propriate for whites to presume that racism still exists, but that they
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and everyone who really wants to actually gets ahead on individual
merit alone. Instead, the presumption of all Americans must be that,
though in fact virtually everyone does need to work hard to get
ahead, our society may well still be riddled with systems of racial in-
equity that whites are reluctant to give up-and that it is nonetheless
in the best interests of everyone in our society to end those systems of
racial inequity.
Philip Klinkner and I have argued that the question that must be
asked, in equal protection law and even more in governmental poli-
cymaking, is not whether a law or policy is "color-blind," or even
whether it harms blacks or whites as distinct groups." The question
should be whether the law or policy is helping to alleviate, or serving
to exacerbate, the patterns of racial inequity and disadvantage that
our laws and politics have done so much to create. The vision of race
that this approach reflects is one in which systematic racial inequali-
ties eventually are so substantially diminished that race is no longer a
powerful predictor of personal life chances. It is not, however, a vi-
sion of race in which racial identities themselves ultimately disappear,
or at least not necessarily. As I argued at the outset, whatever their
origins, these are identities that many have come to see as tremen-
dously important to their senses of themselves and of their preferred
communities. If people wish to value and sustain their memberships
in social groups that are commonly labeled "black" or "white" or
"Asian" or anything else, they should certainly always be able to do so.
But if racial identities could be transformed so that they were no
longer systematically associated with highly unequal resources and
opportunities, these identities would be valued, if they were valued at
all, for their own sakes.
Although I think this is the right direction to move in, I acknowl-
edge that it does not provide clear and certain answers to the persis-
tent and intractable problem of how the law should treat race. Most
importantly, there is unfortunately still room for sharp disagreement
on the crucial question of whether race-conscious measures are es-
sential to, or antithetical to, the goal of freeing American racial iden-
tities from their origins in systems of exploitation and oppression and
their entanglement with ongoing structures of inequality. I believe
that in many instances, these measures are indeed essential, but that
we must judge each particular mechanism for change on its own mer-
its, as defined by the general guideline that Phil Klinkner and I have
advanced. 3 Working out the implications of that guideline is, how-
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ever, a task for many other occasions. If the preceding analysis has
persuaded you that modern law is continuing to construct racial
identities in America, whether we wish that to be the case or not, and
that the dominant conceptions visible in modern law remain deeply
problematic, then it has, I hope, provided some useful insights into
the current state of America's most enduring political dilemma.
